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1 Is a welfare state necessary? 
There are powerful arguments for the welfare state: it addresses major market failures; by 
sharing risks, it facilitates economic growth; it pursues widely-supported equity objectives; 
and it contributes to social cohesion.  
 
Important implications follow. First, to the extent that the welfare state has a significant 
efficiency role, opposition by libertarian writers is misplaced because it fails to take account 
of information problems, behavioural issues, and incomplete markets. Thus the right question 
is not whether to have a welfare state but what form it should take. That theoretical argument 
has historical support. Governments, including those of Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher, came to power pledging to roll back the frontiers of the state. In practice, there was 
little change in welfare-state spending. 
 
Once the welfare state’s efficiency role is understood, this finding is not surprising. 
Social institutions are relevant to the population at large, not just to the poor. The welfare 
state is justified not only by redistributive aims but because it does things that private markets 
for technical reasons would either not do at all, or would do inefficiently. We need a welfare 
state of some sort for efficiency reasons, and would continue to do so even if all poverty 
problems had been solved. 
 
That said, the welfare state is not a complete solution. It may make unemployment more 
bearable but does little to reduce the number of unemployed; nor does it improve working 
conditions; and many people, including women and ethnic minorities, are underprivileged for 
reasons not directly connected with poverty.  
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2 Is the welfare state desirable? 
MISTAKEN OBJECTIVES? Libertarians, espousing freedom and choice, argue that the welfare 
state threatens individual freedom. The validity of that view depends on the weight given to 
freedom compared with other objectives, and also how freedom is defined: to a Libertarian, it 
means absence of coercion, to social democrats freedom includes an element of security. 
 
AN INHERENTLY MISTAKEN ENTERPRISE? Libertarians argue that a large purposeful collective 
enterprise is not possible, pointing to the coordination problems that beset central planning. 
However, the welfare state is not a monolith, but comprises smaller components. Secondly, 
many of these components are publicly financed but privately and competitively produced—
welfare does not have to be state welfare. Thirdly, where market failures are severe, state 
action, albeit imperfect, may produce the least-bad outcomes. 
 
DAMAGING TO ECONOMIC GROWTH? Several arguments should be distinguished. 
 
Does the welfare state reduce growth? It is not controversial to argue that beyond a 
certain point higher taxation harms growth. What is controversial is (a) where that point is, 
and (b) the mechanism by which welfare-state spending might reduce growth. The issue 
remains disputed, as Atkinson (1995, Ch. 6) makes clear. 
 Welfare-state spending varies widely around the OECD average, with no evidence 
that growth has been slower in high-spending countries or vice versa. 
 If the charge is that the level of welfare-state spending is too high, then, ‘the Welfare 
State is no more than a co-defendant with other elements of the state budget’ (p. 123). 
 Causation can be problematic. Does higher spending reduce growth, or do countries 
with lower growth need to spend a larger fraction of GDP alleviating poverty? 
 
Are assessments of the welfare state well specified?  The flaws in an argument that 
considers costs but ignores benefits are obvious.  
‘The emphasis by economists on the negative economic effects of the welfare state can 
be attributed to the theoretical framework adopted . . . which remains rooted in a model 
of perfectly competitive and perfectly clearing markets. [This] theoretical framework 
incorporates none of the contingencies for which the welfare state exists …. The whole 
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purpose of welfare state provision is missing from the theoretical model’ (Atkinson 
1999, p. 8, emphasis added). 
 
Atkinson’s point is that a model based on the assumptions of perfectly-functioning 
markets systematically rules out the market failures that it is one of the fundamental tasks of 
the welfare state to address.  
 
Is reduced growth necessarily a problem? Even if the welfare state reduces growth, that 
is not the end of the argument. If in state-of-the-world A (‘capitalism’), there is rapid growth 
but little security, electorates may prefer to trade some growth for increased security, 
analogous to an insurance premium. At its broadest, this is a stylized representation of the 
development of the welfare state over the twentieth century. In state of-the-world B 
(‘communism’), there is considerable material security but growth rates are low. People are 
therefore willing (as in the former Communist countries) to adopt market mechanisms, 
offering the potential for higher living standards at a cost of less security. In short, too little 
security reduces well-being; so does too much.  
 
DAMAGING INCENTIVE EFFECTS? Some writers argue that social benefits, are not the cure to 
social ills but part of their cause, in that social assistance creates a ‘culture of poverty’. The 
counter-view is that labour-market behaviour, crime, and single parenthood are far too 
complex to be explained only—or even mainly—by the incentives offered by social benefits. 
 
3 Is the welfare state feasible? 
Even if the welfare state is desirable, does it remain feasible?  
 
IS THE WELFARE STATE COMPATIBLE WITH A GLOBAL ECONOMY? Today much economic 
activity takes the form of computer-transmitted information. Thus national boundaries 
become porous, making competition global and reducing the freedom of any country to 
conduct an independent economic policy. The implications for the welfare state, however, are 
not necessarily apocalyptic. 
The world is not wholly global. Competition is powerful but not all powerful. Not all 
goods are tradeable. Nor are all factors mobile: labour mobility is reduced by choice (people 
Nicholas Barr: Welfare State 4 31 March 2016 
 
prefer to stay with their language, culture and family) and because of constraints on 
migration. 
Western countries can adapt.  Box 1 summarizes an important but often overlooked 
distinction between two ways – scale and structure – in which countries can adapt. Global 
pressures are not an argument for dismantling the welfare state, still less for radical structural 
change such as privatization. Rather, they are an argument for reducing the scale of some 
welfare-state activities. 
 
Newly industrialized countries may also adapt. Unless developing countries are very 
different, rising incomes and the weakening of extended family ties will lead to demands for 
rising social spending in those countries. Thus a plausible outcome of global competition is 
some convergence.  
 
Box 1  What type of change: scale v. structure? 
It is important to keep two issues logically separate. 
 What should be the scale of the state’s activities—that is, the level of public spending on 
income transfers, health care, education, and the like? 
 What is the appropriate structure of activity—that is, the public/private mix? 
The first is largely a matter of budgetary balance—an issue of macroeconomics and political 
economy. The second is microeconomic. It is concerned with which activities are most efficiently 
privately financed and/or privately produced and which are not.  The distinction is important: a 
budgetary crisis is not a reason for privatization.  
 
DEMOGRAPHICALLY SUSTAINABLE? A range of policies address the problem of population 
ageing. Output can be increased by: 
 Increasing the productivity of each individual worker, e.g. through higher investment 
in physical and human capital; 
 Increasing the number of workers, e.g. by raising labour-force participation,  raising 
retirement age, and/or by importing labour directly (immigration) or indirectly 
(exporting capital to countries with a young labour force). 
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If those policies are not a complete solution, demand can be reduced by reducing 
consumption by workers (e.g. through higher taxes or contributions) or by reducing 
consumption by pensioners (e.g. through lower monthly benefits).  Thus the scale of pensions 
may need some reduction, but that is not an argument for radical change in structure. 
 
COMPATIBLE WITH SOCIAL CHANGE? Labour-market relationships and family structures have 
both become more diverse and more fluid. As a result, contributions related to employment 
are a less-good fit than in the past, suggesting that a non-contributory element in the pension 
system, as in Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Canada, is useful both to address 
elderly poverty and for reasons of gender balance.  
 
COMPATIBLE WITH ECONOMIC CRISIS?  The economic crisis created pressures to reduce 
welfare-state spending (i.e. scale), but does not call the institution into question (structure).  
The argument that the crisis weakens the case for a welfare state is 180 degrees mistaken. 
Rather, the crisis emphasizes the centrality of the welfare state as a device for risk sharing.   
 
A LONGER-TERM CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE? Parts of the system certainly require change.  
And the welfare state is adapting.  
 Demographic change means that pensions and health care will continue to face 
resource constraints, creating further upward pressure on retirement age. 
 There will be mounting pressure for new insurance instruments (public, private, or 
mixed) to cover contingencies such as long-term care. 
 New lending instruments will emerge. Income-contingent loans will increasingly pay 
for part of the costs of post-compulsory education and training.  
 
POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE? The survival of the welfare state depends on political as well as 
economic sustainability. Libertarians argue that the state takes on tasks (e.g. the abolition of 
poverty) that are impossible, that failure undermines the state, and thus the welfare state 
contains the seeds of its own political demise. The exact opposite can be asserted. It is the 
welfare state that has made capitalism, with its attendant benefits of economic growth, 
politically feasible. Failure to address poverty can be destabilizing and politically damaging. 
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Discussion should not be about whether there should be a welfare state, but about its 
precise form and its distributional objectives. In reaching a similar conclusion, Glennerster 
points to two crucial sets of facts. First, the level of taxation and social spending varies 
widely and is not correlated in any obvious way with economic performance. Secondly, in the 
UK in 1945, ‘in a ravaged economy, when real incomes were less than half what they are 
today, people voted for what came to be called the welfare state, and paid the price, and voted 
to continue affording it’ (Glennerster 1997: 298). 
 
Thus the future of the welfare state depends not only on economic feasibility, but also 
very much on what people, through the political process, decide that they want. 
 
4 Conclusion 
A defence, however robust, understates the strong positive case for the welfare state. 
 It exists not only to provide poverty relief (its ‘Robin Hood’ function) but also to offer 
insurance and consumption smoothing
3
 (the ‘Piggy Bank’ function) in areas that 
private institutions are able to cover incompletely, if at all. It also has an important 
role in fostering social cohesion. 
 There is increasing evidence that the roots of exclusion lie in early childhood, 
stressing the need for policies to support and enhance families. Such policies—a 
confluence of economics and social policy—involve cash benefits, health care, and 
education (including nursery education), alongside broader policies to improve 
parenting. Again, such activities require state action. 
 The insurance element will become increasingly important. Risk and uncertainly are 
likely to intensify. An OECD report (2003) emphasises natural disasters, 
technological accidents, infectious diseases, food safety, and terrorism. Actuarial 
insurance is not able to address problems of this type or on this scale. The 2008 
economic crisis reinforces the salience of insurance.  
 The previous point emphasises the importance of the welfare state as a device for risk 
sharing. Too little risk is suboptimal because it gives no incentive for risk-taking (e.g. 
low growth rates under communism). Too much risk is also suboptimal because it 
                                                 
3
 I.e. redistribution from a person’s younger self to his/her older self. 
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creates incentives against taking risks (in the absence of a safety net, a failed business 
start-up can leave a family destitute). Thus one of the purposes of the welfare state is 
to share risks optimally. From that perspective, far from being a regrettable necessity, 
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